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103 
WHAT IS DILUTION, ANYWAY? 
Stacey L. Dogan* † 
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc. in 2003, an amendment to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(“FTDA”) has appeared inevitable. Congress almost certainly meant to 
adopt a “likelihood of dilution” standard in the original statute, and the 2006 
revisions correct its sloppy drafting. Substituting a “likelihood of dilution” 
standard for “actual dilution,” however, does not resolve a deeper philoso-
phical question that has always lurked in the dilution debate: what is 
dilution, and how does one prove or disprove its probability? The statutory 
definition notwithstanding, this issue remains largely unanswered, leaving 
the courts with the responsibility—and the power—to delineate dilution’s 
scope.  
Judging from the ambiguous legislative history and the messy history of 
dilution in the states, courts will have broad discretion in exercising their 
authority. The absence of any consistent normative vision for dilution means 
that judges will shape that vision, along with the doctrinal framework for 
pursuing it. In doing so, they face a stark choice between one approach that 
largely comports with traditional trademark theory, and another that trans-
forms the law’s purpose and effect. Because the more radical option imposes 
substantial costs without any obvious social benefits, courts would do well 
to adopt the more modest version. 
I. 
Dilution, as originally conceived, referred to the harm that occurs when 
a famous, distinctive mark loses its singular meaning. Frank Schechter, the 
first American proponent of the theory, described it as “the gradual whittling 
away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the 
mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.” In Schechter’s view, 
the law should protect against “the possibility of vitiation of identity” of 
unique marks. His concern, in other words, was about the loss of individual-
ity for marks that could claim that feature. 
Schechter’s theory of dilution came with important limitations. He ex-
pressly limited the proposed protection to fanciful or coined terms, for only 
these had the “uniqueness and singularity” that he sought to protect. The 
dilution claim that Schechter envisioned, moreover, would apply only when 
another party adopted the same mark on a non-competing product. These 
two limitations made sense in light of the harm that Schechter was  
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concerned about: when a mark starts out with a unique meaning, its strength 
and singularity undoubtedly suffer through the use of the same mark by un-
related vendors. 
When defined this way, Schechter’s theory fits comfortably within the 
dominant theoretical model of trademark law. That model, first articulated 
by William Landes and Richard Posner some twenty years ago, suggests 
that trademark protection exists in order to reduce consumer search costs. 
By providing reliable short-hand information about the source and quality of 
products, trademarks make it easier for consumers to identify products with 
desired qualities, and thereby reduce transaction costs and enhance competi-
tion. Under this approach, protecting famous marks against dilution makes 
good sense. Dilution of a unique mark increases consumer search costs by 
making consumers who once associated any mention of the mark with its 
owner look further for context.  
Over time, however, the dilution theory has evolved into a more compli-
cated beast. While many of its advocates remain loyal to Schechter’s 
original vision, others take a decidedly different view of the harms that dilu-
tion law seeks to prevent. Rather than a surgical tool to avoid “vitiation” of 
the singular meaning of unique marks, these proponents view dilution as an 
overarching mechanism to prevent free-riding on famous marks’ reputations. 
Under this view, the inquiry in dilution cases is not whether a defendant’s 
use destroys a mark’s uniqueness, but whether the defendant has somehow 
profited by evoking the famous mark in the minds of the public.  
This broader view of dilution occasionally cropped up in case law and 
legislative history surrounding the FTDA. The original House Report stated 
that the FTDA was creating “a federal cause of action to protect famous 
marks from unauthorized users that attempt to trade upon the goodwill and 
established renown of such marks and, thereby, dilute their distinctive qual-
ity.” Courts applying the statute before V Secret frequently quoted that 
language and recognized claims based on the defendant’s attempt to trade 
on the fame of the protected mark. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit described Con-
gress’s goal in passing the FTDA as preventing “out-of-market free riding.” 
Even when they did not explicitly mention free-riding, courts often pre-
sumed dilution based solely upon a “mental association” between a 
defendant’s mark and the plaintiff’s. Proof of dilution, under this approach, 
was oddly defendant-centric, focused on whether the defendant intended to 
evoke the plaintiff’s trademark, rather than on the impact of the use on the 
power of the plaintiff’s mark. 
The Supreme Court’s V Secret opinion put an end (albeit temporarily) to 
this conclusory form of dilution analysis. By requiring plaintiffs to prove 
harm to the distinctiveness of their marks, the Supreme Court returned the 
focus of dilution claims to the original Schechter formulation: will the chal-
lenged use spoil the singularity of plaintiff’s unique mark? Critics, seizing 
on the “actual dilution” language, have charged the Supreme Court with 
adopting an insurmountable evidentiary standard, and that charge is appeal-
ing if one doesn’t look beyond the “actual dilution” nomenclature. The 
Court’s analysis, however, is more nuanced than the actual dilution designa-
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tion alone would suggest. While no model of clarity, the opinion appears 
primarily concerned with forcing plaintiffs to prove the likely consequences 
of a challenged use of their mark. An actual dilution standard, the Court 
held, “does not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an actual 
loss of sales or profits, must also be proved.” In some cases, circumstantial 
evidence—such as identity of marks—will suffice, because third-party use 
of a unique mark will indeed impair that mark’s singularity. What it does 
mean is that the plaintiff must prove more than a mental association between 
the defendant’s mark and its own, for “such mental association will not nec-
essarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its 
owner, the statutory requirement for dilution under the FTDA.” “Blurring” 
held the Court, “is not a necessary consequence of mental association.” 
Under this interpretation, the Supreme Court may well have suggested a 
likelihood of dilution standard under the guise of an actual dilution test. 
Whatever the true nature of the V Secret inquiry, however, the “actual dilu-
tion” designation perplexed lower courts and incensed trademark holders 
and their friends in Congress. As a result, shortly after the V Secret opinion, 
Congress began drafting legislation to reverse the “actual dilution” standard. 
Last month, a bill finally passed in the form of the Trademark Revisions Act 
of 2006, which explicitly adopts a “likelihood of dilution” test. 
While making “likelihood of dilution” the new benchmark for liability, 
the revised statute does not abandon the Schechter formulation for defining 
dilution’s nature. The statute retains a harm-focused approach to dilution, 
defining both tarnishment and blurring with reference to injury to a famous 
mark. Blurring, the statute states, “is association arising from the similarity 
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinct-
iveness of the famous mark.” Tarnishment is defined as “association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that 
harms the reputation of the famous mark.” On its face, then, the statute ap-
pears to require trademark holders to establish that a defendant’s use will 
likely harm the distinctiveness or reputation of its trademark—not merely 
that the defendant has evoked its mark or taken a free-ride on its good stand-
ing. Nonetheless, the legislative history of the revisions again reflects an 
occasional anti-free-riding impulse. The statute’s use of the term “associa-
tion,” moreover, has led courts to focus their analysis solely on the existence 
of mental association between two marks, rather than the likelihood of harm 
to the famous one. If experience is any guide, some courts will feel tempted 
to make the causal leap between mental association and dilution, and con-
clude that any use that calls to mind a famous mark will probably dilute it. 
II. 
Courts interpreting the revised FTDA, then, will have to choose between 
two dueling visions of the meaning of dilution and the evidence required to 
prove it. A harm-based approach to dilution would protect the meaning of 
famous trademarks and promote the goal of reducing consumer search costs. 
An unjust-enrichment-based approach, in contrast, would view trademark-
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related goodwill as the famous mark-holder’s property, protected against 
free-riding unless a particular statutory defense applies. 
Numerous scholars and speech advocates have written about the dangers 
of such a property-based view of trademark law. Unlike copyright and pat-
ent law, trademark law has never aimed to provide exclusive rights in marks, 
but has focused on preserving informational clarity in the marketplace. 
When a use does not impair that clarity, there is no concrete social benefit to 
enjoining it. While commentators have occasionally suggested that free-
riding might impair the incentive to invest in high prestige marks, there is no 
evidence to support that proposition. An anti-free-riding presumption, 
moreover, would put the burden on defendants in numerous contexts to jus-
tify behavior that has important economic and expressive benefits. 
Trademark law is replete with examples of “free-riding” that promotes, 
rather than thwarts, the law’s informational objectives. Pepsi clearly took a 
ride on Coca-Cola’s reputation when it launched the Pepsi Challenge many 
years ago. By using the draw of the Coca-Cola name, Pepsi attracted sub-
stantially more attention than it would have in an ad campaign without the 
Coke reference. Andy Warhol similarly derived economic benefit from the 
fame of the Campbell’s Soup brand. Supermarkets and drug stores draw 
from the popularity of famous trademarks when they locate generic versions 
of drugs and other consumer products immediately beside their branded 
counterparts. Advertisers in magazines and newspapers derive benefits from 
placing ads next to articles about famous brands. Each of these uses brings 
economic benefits to society by enhancing consumer choice and increasing 
competition. While some of them fall within a specific statutory exemption 
in the FTDA, not all of them do; putting the burden on the defendants to 
establish that their particular “free-ride” was justifiable would inevitably 
chill speech—and competition—at the margins.  
III. 
Given the significant costs associated with a free-riding-based standard, 
courts would do well to follow the harm-based approach that informed 
Schechter’s original vision, and that the literal language of the revised 
FTDA seems to require. In evaluating the likelihood of dilution under such a 
standard, courts should consider whether the plaintiff has proven that the 
defendant’s use is likely to impair the singular meaning of its famous trade-
mark. The following principles should guide courts in making this 
determination:  
The inquiry must distinguish between injury to the trademark, on the 
one hand, and unjust enrichment of defendant, on the other. As the Supreme 
Court held in V Secret, a use that merely evokes a famous trademark will not 
necessarily harm that mark’s distinctiveness or reputation. Nor does the fact 
that a defendant obtained some benefit from the evocation establish, by it-
self, probable injury to the famous mark.  
As the statute suggests, the burden of proof lies firmly with the plaintiff 
to establish that the use at issue is likely to harm the singularity of its mark. 
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The plaintiff, in other words, bears the burden of establishing not only that 
the defendant has created an association between its mark and the plain-
tiff’s, but that the association will likely blur or tarnish the meaning of the 
plaintiff’s mark in the minds of the public. In the case of a unique mark 
adopted, in identical form, by a third party, the harm may logically follow. 
In other cases involving mere evocation, however, plaintiffs must go further 
and present evidence of the causal relationship between that evocation and a 
reduction in their mark’s selling power. As Professor McCarthy has argued 
in his treatise, judges applying a likelihood of dilution standard “should de-
mand persuasive evidence that dilution is likely to occur. . . . Even the 
probability of dilution should be proven by evidence, not just by theoretical 
assumptions about what possibly could occur or might happen.” 
IV. 
Congress had good reason to correct its drafting error and restore a like-
lihood of dilution standard to the FTDA. While the precise legal standard 
adopted by the Supreme Court in V Secret has been overruled, however, its 
opinion contains important wisdom about the meaning of dilution and the 
evidence required to prove it. That wisdom applies with equal force to the 
revised statute, and we can only hope that courts will heed it. 
